Discounters and consumer groups have replied that RPM denies consumers the benefits of efficient, low-cost distribution. While the controversy over RPM was muted in the 1980's, the antitrust authorities have recently begun aggressively to attack RPM schemes in a number of industries, with more activity promised. 5 One important reason for the continuing wrangling over RPM is the absence of a theory capable of explaining its use for the "simple" products comprising an important fraction of RPM use (Ippolito and Overstreet, forthcoming) . Such products do not require extensive demandenhancing pre-sale services threatened by free riding. 6 In contrast to explanations based on services, our theory interprets RPM as a mechanism to increase the manufacturer's distribution in order better to serve existing demand, rather than to expand demand. 7 In our model, retailers simply choose prices and quantities without any added complications concerning service or quality. Our focus on RPM as a method for preserving distribution appears commonly would impair brand-name distribution by causing retailers other than the discounter either to reduce inventories or to drop the product altogether. Examples of this position from early controversies over RPM can be found in United States, Federal Trade Commission, Report of the Federal Trade Commission on Resale Price Maintenance (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945), p. 7-9, 43ff. For examples from the 1960's see U.S., Senate, "Quality Stabilization," Hearings, 88th cong., 1964, particularly pp. 614ff., the statement of the Toilet Goods Association, pp. 619-20. 5 The continuing widespread use of RPM is indicated by the range of recent RPM prosecutions, which have involved toys, athletic and casual shoes, hockey skates, indoor tanning products, and video games. As an FTC Commissioner notes, "there's a lot of clamor for additional enforcement in vertical price fixing cases." See "Starek Foresees Increased FTC Scrutiny over Vertical Restraints in Distribution." Antitrust and Trade Regulation Report, August 5, 1993, p. 199. 6 Telser (1960) argues that the demand for a manufacturer's product will often depend on retailer-provided pre-sale services. Retailers will have an incentive to offer such services only if they can capture the demand the services generate. But if customers shop for the lowest price subsequent to obtaining service at a full service retailer, service-providing retailers will be at a competitive disadvantage relative to no-frills discounters who do not incur the cost of services and price accordingly. Free riding is often encouraged by discounters. (As one example, Wisconsin Discount Stereo advertised "It's easy to save! Just do your shopping (getting brand and model numbers.) Then call us and save $$." (Audio, May 1988, pp. 89-90.) ) If enough customers sought services at one retail firm and purchased at a discount rival, the high-service retailer would reduce or eliminate services, constricting the demand for the manufacturer's product.
The free-rider theory requires that candidate products for RPM have characteristics about which retailers can offer useful advice, and suggests that RPM is most likely when products are newly introduced, so that consumers are ill-informed. Our model explains RPM use for cases where services appear absent, including familiar, uncomplicated products with pronounced demand uncertainty, such as items with strong seasonal demand components. In our model, RPM increases retail inventories, not a retail activity threatened by free riding. A consumer cannot make a selection from a store with a large inventory and then confidently go to a limited-availability discount outlet to purchase that item. 7 A recent paper by Winter (1993) has shown that with consumer heterogeneity, excessive retailer emphasis of price competition over service competition can lower the final demand for the manufacturer's product, even if the services in question are not subject to free riding. Our approach relies neither on demand-enhancing services nor on heterogeneous customers, and hence differs substantially from Winter's. Instead, we argue that excessive retailer price competition results in a decreased supply of the manufacturer's product to the market. Our emphasis on maintaining adequate retail inventories appears appropriate, since this problem is the principal stated concern of manufacturers in the case studies below. See also note 6 above.
in manufacturer justifications for their use of the practice. For example, one careful study of a case involving Corning cookware (Ippolito and Overstreet, forthcoming) finds both that the stated motivation for Corning's use of RPM was to increase distribution, and that sales fell relative to those of competitors when Corning's RPM use was prohibited.
Our paper provides a theoretical explanation for why RPM could benefit both consumers and manufacturers when Holmes' "knaves" would otherwise have destroyed the manufacturers' distribution. But in contrast to other efficiency-based theories of RPM, theories in which manufacturer and consumer interests roughly coincide, we show that manufacturer benefits can often come principally from consumer surplus. Manufacturers may still wish to suppress discounting even if high price retailers would not have abandoned their products; in such cases, consumers may prefer that discounters be permitted to flourish.
The following elements are central to our theory:
• uncertainty over the demand for the manufacturer's product,
• the manufacturer's need for its product to be on retailer shelves before that uncertainty is resolved, and
• retailers must incur some costs of unsold inventory.
These elements are particularly prominent in recent manufacturer attempts to achieve control over resale prices through the use of minimum advertised pricing (MAP) promotions.
MAP plans are a form of cooperative advertising arrangement under which the manufacturer agrees to pay a rebate to dealers, at least nominally intended to reimburse dealers for dealer advertising featuring the manufacturer's product. 8 The MAP provision requires that in order to receive such rebates, a dealer must not advertise a price lower than that specified by the manufacturer. This form of RPM enforcement was of doubtful legality up until 1990, but with recent FTC approval, MAP plans have spread rapidly. Products now covered by MAP plans include video recordings of movies sold rather than rented to consumers (sell-through videos), 9 compact disks, 10 women's apparel, 11 and toys. 12 The MAP plans, focused as they are on dealer price and availability advertising, indicate that retailers commit to prices in advertising placed prior to the demand period. The demand period is often particularly brief for videos and CD's, sales of which are tied to extensive advertising campaigns undertaken by the manufacturer.
The substantial advertising campaigns mounted for such products require that they be on retail shelves awaiting consumers motivated to shop by advertising exposure. The manufacturer's willingness to pay retailers for retailer promotional advertising and services, together with large manufacturer advertising campaigns, indicates that the manufacturers can deal directly with potential free rider problems. Finally, demand uncertainty is substantial. Even a theatrical hit like "Wayne's World" has lead to millions of unsold videocassettes. 13 Clearly the demand for fashion and fad products generally is difficult to predict with precision.
We proceed as follows. Section 1 models retailer competition assuming that the value consumers place on the manufacturer's product is known, but the number of customers is uncertain. Section 2 generalizes the analysis to arbitrary demand and introduces positive costs of manufacturing and distribution. Section 3 discusses the welfare effects of permitting RPM and illustrates why consumers may oppose RPM that increases total welfare. While we are primarily concerned with markets in which retailers must commit to prices prior to the realization of demand, Section 4 suggests that our conclusions remain valid when the retail price is determined by market clearing. Section 5 analyzes a historical example of RPM use in which the characteristics of the market closely fit our model. We also discuss a very prominent recent use of a MAP policy to control retail prices, namely the introduction of Microsoft Windows 95. Section 6 summarizes the results and considers their implications for the political economy of RPM.
Fixed Reservation Prices
To illustrate why manufacturers might wish to prevent discounting of their products, we start by describing our framework and presenting a simple example. Consider a risk-neutral monopoly manufacturer of a well-established branded product that sells to a large number of risk neutral, perfectly competitive retailers. 14 More precisely, we assume that there is a continuum of retailers, indexed by t ∈ [0, 1]. The manufacturer faces a constant marginal cost of production, c w . We assume that retailers have a constant marginal cost of inventory holdings, c r 1 , and constant marginal cost of sales, c r 2 , and without loss of generality normalize them to be zero. 15 We assume that the final demand for the manufacturer's product is random.
Prior to the resolution of this demand uncertainty, the manufacturer must set p w and the retailers must order their inventories. 16 We assume that unsold merchandise has no scrap value. 17 This implies that retailers face a tradeoff in choosing their level of inventory: larger inventories increase sales in high demand states, but produce greater losses in low demand states. We compare two methods of choosing retail prices: niche competition and RPM.
The Niche Competition Game. First, the manufacturer sets the wholesale price. Next, retailers choose simultaneously what retail price to set and how much inventory to hold.
Finally, demand is realized. Demand is allocated to the lowest priced firm first; residual demand, if any, goes to the next lowest priced firm, and so forth.
The RPM Game. First, the manufacturer sets its wholesale price, p w , and the retail price at 14 We follow the RPM literature in assuming that the manufacturer has some degree of monopoly power arising from its brand. But even were the manufacturer to sell its product at marginal cost, the inefficiency we identify persists. Hence, if RPM were legal, manufacturers would choose unilaterally to impose RPM. 15 Inventory holding costs can be absorbed into the manufacturer's production cost, and the cost of providing sales is handled by reinterpreting inverse demand as willingness to pay above c which its product is resold, p r . Next, retailers choose simultaneously how much inventory to hold, prior to the resolution of uncertainty. Finally, demand is realized. Consumers, indifferent among retailers, are assumed to choose firms so as to equate the ratio of sales to inventory across firms. That is, when there is excess supply, the probability of any unit being sold is the same for all firms.
For our example, we make the following assumptions. Manufacturing is costless, c w = 0.
Every consumer has the same reservation value, v = 1, which is the same in every state of the world. The number of customers that arrive is uncertain. Three equal probability states are possible, indexed by i = 1, 2, 3. Our assumed demand conditions are as indicated in Table 1 . 
Analyzing the Niche Competition Game
Given the wholesale price, the retail market subgame of the niche competition game described above is essentially the "hotels" model of Prescott (1975) , also studied by Bryant (1980), Lucas and Woodford (1992) , Eden (1990) , and Dana (1993) . If p w is low enough, then Nash equilibrium entails retail market segmentation. Low price retailers are able to sell their entire inventories, but will often stock out. High price retailers will stock inventories to be sold in high demand states, but will be left with unsold inventories when demand is low. In equilibrium, expected profits are zero in each niche. The intuition is that positive profits earned by any retailer would invite rival firms to undercut the profitable firm's price to acquire those profits.
The following strategies constitute an equilibrium to the retail subgame, given p w ≤ 1.
Retailers t ∈ [0, 1/3) each stock q(t) = 3 at a retail price equal to the wholesale price, p We claim that the above configuration of prices and aggregate quantities is the unique equilibrium configuration. The lowest retail price must be p w , for otherwise (much like in ordinary Bertrand competition) noninfinitesimal profit opportunities exist for a firm that undercuts the lowest price. At the retail price equal to p w , the total quantity supplied must be one; a higher quantity leads to negative profits and a lower quantity leads to residual demand and noninfinitesimal profit opportunities. Given one unit is offered at the retail price equal to p w , if a positive quantity is offered at a higher retail price, that price must be 3p w 2 . 19 A lower retail price yields negative profits. A retail price higher than 3p w /2 is either greater than one, and therefore inconsistent with equillbrium, or results in noninfinitesimal profit opportunities which induce undercutting. As above, if a positive quantity is offered at the 18 Because there is a continuum of retailers, no single retailer faces positive residual demand, so there is no incentive to raise the retail price. Our equilibrium, then, might not be the limit of equilibria in markets with a finite number of retailers, since residual demand exists away from the limit. This inelegant feature is removed if we slightly perturb the timing of the niche competition game, so that retailers first simultaneously choose their retail prices, followed by simultaneously choosing their quantities. 19 A positive quantity will be offered only if 3p w /2 ≤ 1. If 3p w /2 > 1, no units will be demanded at a retail price in excess of 1, and any lower retail price yields negative profits.
price 3p
w /2, that quantity must be exactly one. By the same reasoning, given the behavior in the lower price niches, if a positive quantity is offered at a retail price higher than 3p
price must be 3p w and the quantity offered must be exactly one.
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Having solved the retail subgame, we may now characterize the full equilibrium. Clearly, the manufacturer will choose the highest p w consistent with a given aggregate inventory level, It is apparent that the manufacturer chooses to serve two niches with a wholesale price of 2/3. The retail price for niche 2 is 1; customers who purchase at this price do not receive any surplus. Niche 3 generates no surplus since it is never served. Niche 1 retailers always sell out their stocks of the good and these sales always generate consumer surplus of 1/3. Expected consumer surplus is therefore 1/3.
Analyzing the RPM Game
If the manufacturer is able to impose resale price maintenance, discount niches cannot emerge.
Clearly, the optimal retail price will be p r = 1, for this price extracts all surplus in each state.
Given the manufacturer's wholesale price, retailers compete by ordering aggregate inventories, Table 3 .
It is easily checked that the manufacturer optimizes by setting p w = 2/3, yielding q w = 3
and Π = 2. Since retailers make zero profits in any event, 21 the manufacturer receives all the surplus. 22 Consequently, the manufacturer will prefer to induce full stocking.
RPM benefits the manufacturer in this example, since the wholesale price remains unchanged as inventory holdings increase by 50%. Note also that total surplus under resale price maintenance (2) exceeds the sum of manufacturer profits 4 3 and expected consumer surplus 1 3 under niche competition. RPM yields a welfare optimum.
This simple example shows that manufacturers prefer not to have discounters carry their product simply because the discounters inhibit the willingness of higher-priced dealers to hold stocks. Indeed, a direct comparison of Tables 2 and 3 shows that the imposition of RPM has shifted out the entire wholesale demand schedule. Retailers are competitive in any event, so their interests play little or no role in our model. However, in contrast to the freerider model of resale price maintenance, the manufacturer's desire to inhibit discounting is not in the consumer's interest. As long as most surplus is extracted by the manufacturer's required resale price, consumers will prefer the uncertain prospect of a discount price to assured availability of a good that does not yield surplus.
It is instructive to trace through the process by which unrestrained retail competition destroys wholesale demand. Suppose the manufacturer keeps the wholesale price at the RPM optimum, p w = 2/3, 23 but frees up the retail price. A discounter stocking one unit will then find it profitable to undercut the retail price of p r = 1. Since consumers will always buy from the lowest-priced retailer first, the discounter is assured to sell this unit, and thereby earn positive profits. Other discounters will follow, driving the retail price in the first niche 22 It is straightforward to show that our "competitive" RPM solution is the limit of Nash equilibria of the finite RPM game, where the number of retailers approaches infinity. 23 The same reasoning can be applied for any wholesale price, explaining the shift in the wholesale demand curve. Theorem 2 shows that the argument generalizes to arbitrary demand, costs, and uncertainty. down to p r 1 = 2/3, where no further profits can be earned. Meanwhile, stores not discounting will lose money, since they can no longer sell during low demand states. Indeed, with their collective orders equal to 2 (q w minus niche 1 demand served by discounters), expected profits will be equal to -1/3. By reducing their orders by one unit, expected revenues decline by 1/3
(revenue in state 3 declines by one unit), but costs decline by 2/3, restoring profitability. The manufacturer, however, loses since its wholesale price is unchanged as wholesale demand declines.
The General Demand Specification
Section 1 provided an example with rectangular demand and common reservation prices to
show that the manufacturer prefers RPM over unrestrained retail competition. Without RPM, discount retailers are first in line to serve demand, and hence lower the probability of sale of the remaining retailers. To be profitable, those attempting to sell to high demand niches are forced to raise their prices. Since the retail price under RPM was already set at the highest possible level (the reservation price), niche competition results in fewer niches served. The absence of a demand expansion effect resulting from lower retail prices then implies that the manufacturer's wholesale demand declines. But while compelling, this intuition is clearly tied to the common reservation price beneath which demand is inelastic. This section generalizes our results to arbitrary demand. We also allow arbitrary distributions over states of the world, and permit production and distribution to be costly (see note 15).
Without loss of generality, let there be a continuum of possible demand states. Demand in state α is indicated by d (p, α) and is monotone in the following sense: p, α) , and that for each α there existsp(α) cannot satisfy all demand, some customers will remain for higher-priced firms. How much those firms can actually sell depends on how the output of lower-priced firms is rationed. We assume that demand is rationed efficiently in the sense that the segments of demand that are willing to pay the most are matched to the lowest prices. 24 Consequently, firms charging the price p in state α face industry demand at that price less the quantity supplied by lower-priced firms:
Thus Q(p) denotes the cumulative inventory holdings by retailers charging prices strictly below p.
The Retail Subgame under Niche Competition
) denotes the probability that the state is greater than or equal to α. To describe the equilibrium in the retail subgame, we can compute, for each niche α,
Equations (2) and (3) denotes the total inventories held by firms selling to demand pockets less than or equal to α.
The explanation of (2) and (3) is most straightforward when F(α) is strictly increasing and continuous, so that p(α) is strictly increasing and continuous. Consider a retailer catering to niche α, and therefore charging the price p(α). By (3), whenever the state is below α, 24 The details of the rationing rule do not matter when demand is rectangular, although they can be important when demand is elastic. For example, first-come-first-served (FCFS) rationing yields larger residual demand than efficient rationing when demand is elastic. The general solution to the niche competition game with FCFS rationing is complicated, but we have verified that when demand uncertainty is multiplicative (see equation (17) below) and c w = 0 the equilibrium inventories and manufacturer profits are higher under RPM. Furthermore, the welfare results parallel those given in Theorem 5 below. Our conclusions therefore appear to be robust with respect to the choice of the rationing rule.
residual demand at the price p(α) equals zero. With probability F(α), our firm will therefore be unable to sell, and lose p w per unit of inventory held. Suppose now that there is some residual demand in state α, so that d(p(α), α ) > Y(α) for all α > α. Our retailer can sell whenever the state exceeds α, and hence with probability
per unit of inventory held. 25 Competition between retailers forces expected profits per unit of inventory to be zero, as expressed in (2), and pushes inventory levels to the point where Equations (2) and (3) define the equilibrium retail supply function Q(p) parametrically in α. Specifically, upon lettingα(p) = sup{α : p(α) < p}, 26 we have:
Despite the complexity of the retail equilibrium under niche competition, the manufacturer's wholesale demand actually takes on a very simple form: 
The Retail Subgame under RPM
Given the manufacturer's choice of a wholesale price, p w , and a retail price, p r ≥ p w , retailers increase their inventories until retail profits are zero. For any aggregate level of inventory 25 When α is a point of discontinuity of F and there is residual demand in state α at the price p(α), the relevant probability of sale is (1 − G(α) ). Finally, on any interval where F is constant, the price p(α) is constant, so that there are multiple niches facing the same retail price. If we let α 1 = sup{θ ∈ supp F : p(θ) = p(α)}, then the proper interpretation of (2) and (3) is that all retailers charging the price p(α) serve niche α 1 . 26 We use the convention that sup(∅) = −∞ and define Y (α) = 0 for α < ᾱ. 27 The function p(α) is left continuous and increasing, and hence lower semicontinuous. 
Comparing the Manufacturer's Profits
Under niche competition, the manufacturer's wholesale demand is given by (5). Manufacturer profits are therefore equal to
Under RPM, the manufacturer earns Note that the domain of potential optimizers in (8) and (9) is compact, and that the objective functions are upper semicontinuous. A maximum is therefore guaranteed to exist, but need not be uniquely attained.
Before stating our main result, we slightly strengthen the monotonicity of demand in the state as follows: Proof: Since the manufacturer will never set a wholesale price which leaves retailers with positive profits, we may use (7) to rewrite (9) as
The inequality above obtains because for each (p r , α), the maximand in (11) 
Definition (7) 
The Welfare Effects of RPM
We have just shown that given the manufacturer's wholesale price, introducing RPM increases retailers' incentives to hold inventories. However, in equilibrium the manufacturer responds to the outward shift in wholesale demand by adjusting the wholesale price optimally. If, as in the example of Section 1, the manufacturer lowers the wholesale price or keeps it the same, then the introduction of RPM necessarily raises equilibrium inventories. However, it is easy to construct examples in which the manufacturer increases the wholesale price, raising the possibility that equilibrium inventories under RPM would be lower than under niche competition.
Our next result shows that when demand is rectangular with a common reservation price,
this can never occur. (11) and (12) become
Letα belong to the arg max in (15), andα belong to the arg max in (16). Ifα =ᾱ, then we clearly haveα ≤α. Ifα <ᾱ, then since the maximand in (15) has right-hand derivative
. But thenα >α would imply To show that each of these cases can in fact occur, we will now analyze the class of examples with multiplicative demand uncertainty and zero cost. Let states, as well as on how closeα is toᾱ (which in turn depends on the distribution F ). While Theorem 4 generalizes the result on equilibrium inventories, our next result shows that the welfare conclusions of Theorem 3 are indeed peculiar to rectangular demand. Consider the two-point distribution
Then we have The proof of Theorem 5 is immediate. When high demand is unlikely, the manufacturer gives up on the high demand state, and induces the retail price of p m on the certain niche. Consumers face the same retail price as they would under RPM, but suffer the possibility of rationing, and are worse off. On the other hand, when high demand is sufficiently likely for discount and full price retailers to coexist under niche competition, the discounters transfer surplus from the manufacturer to consumers. Total surplus is higher under niche competition because the discount price induces more purchases in the event low demand is realized.
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The results under the two-point distribution (18) are representative of those for general distribution functions, in the following sense. Niche competition reduces consumer and total surplus through the effect of reducing the number of niches served. When the manufacturer chooses a wholesale price (under niche competition) that drives all but the most certain niches 34 Our consumer surplus calculations ignore the costs consumers incur in queueing for the chance to buy at low-price retailers, and are therefore biased against RPM. out of the market, the second effect dominates and everyone prefers RPM. When the manufacturer chooses a wholesale price (under niche competition) that does not drive many niches out, then the first effect dominates and consumers prefer the lower prices available under niche competition.
Flexible Retail Prices
Our model of retail competition has assumed that retailers must commit to prices before demand is realized. This assumption is appropriate for markets in which retailers are slow to react to new demand conditions, for example because demand information is slow to reach retailers or because price information takes time to convey to customers. In markets with few constraints on the ability of retailers to adjust their prices, retail market clearing might be a more appropriate assumption. We claim that our theory is reasonably robust to the specification of the mode of retail competition. To illustrate, we show here that the equilibrium wholesale price, inventory level, manufacturer profit, and consumer surplus under market clearing and niche competition coincide when demand is rectangular.
The Flexible Pricing Game is defined by the following timing. First, the manufacturer sets the wholesale price. Next, retailers simultaneously choose how much inventory to hold. Finally, demand uncertainty is realized, inventories are offered to the market, and the retail price is determined by supply and demand. The proof of Theorem 6 is straightforward, and left as an exercise.
Theorem 6 Suppose demand is given by (14). Then for any wholesale price that is
The intuition for the equivalence is straightforward, and relates to the intuition for Theorem 2. Under niche competition, expected retail revenues are the same as if all retailers chose the retail price offered by the highest niche (which is the reservation value,p), but sold only when demand exceeds the aggregate inventory level. But this is exactly what happens to retailers under market clearing when the same aggregate inventory level is supplied to the market-instead of not selling in the low demand states, the retailer receives a market-clearing price of zero. By avoiding these "fire sales," RPM raises manufacturer profits.
Theorem 6 shows that, at least when demand is given by (14), the manufacturer will choose the same wholesale price and retailers will choose the same inventories under flexible pricing as they do under niche competition. Since total inventories are the same under both regimes, total surplus must be the same. Manufacturer profits are also the same, so consumer surplus must be the same under both regimes. While the equivalence of wholesale demand under niche competition and market clearing breaks down if demand is not rectangular, it is still the case that consumers who are most likely to show up on the market pay a price that is too low from the manufacturer's perspective. Hence the incentive for RPM identified here persists. For a general comparison of RPM versus market clearing, see Deneckere, Marvel and Peck (1995) .
Applications
Our analysis of RPM and niche competition under demand uncertainty can explain a wide variety of uses of RPM. Markets satisfying the following criteria fit our model particularly well.
1. Demand uncertainty matters: the distribution of demand exhibits significant variation and the realization of demand is unknown at the moment all strategic decisions are made.
2. Adequate retailer inventory holdings are critical to the product's success, and restocking dealers from the manufacturer's inventory is at best an imperfect substitute for substantial initial stocks on the dealers' shelves. This criterion will most often be met for products whose demand period is short, perhaps due to seasonality or perhaps to whimsical or faddish consumers.
3. Demand is not storable and instead evaporates at the end of the demand period. Backorders are not significant, customers are unwilling to wait for delayed items, or the need for the product in question disappears.
4. Retail prices are slow to adjust to demand shocks, relative to the length of the period in consideration. 35 Period length is determined by requirements (1)-(3).
5. The product does not require significant amounts of dealer pre-sale services that are subject to free riding. This last criterion is not a strict requirement of our theory. We add it to focus attention on products to which free rider explanations do not apply.
36
In this section, we provide several examples of markets conforming to these characteristics to show that our approach can illuminate RPM uses that are not otherwise readily understood.
As pointed out in the introduction, RPM in the form of minimum advertised price promotions has recently been growing rapidly, and much of the growth has been concentrated in product lines that fit our model criteria well. Past RPM use has also been common for goods with short selling periods and volatile demand. In particular, goods with pronounced seasonality in demand both fit our criteria well and historically have constituted an important locus of RPM use. Examples include goods in demand as holiday, graduation, or wedding gifts, 37 and products whose demand is tied to weather conditions. Indeed, products sensitive to weather conditions exhibit both the uncertainty and inability to store demand that we require. Examples which have been the subject of RPM include lawn and garden equipment, 38 agricultural chemicals, 39 ski equipment 40 and a wide variety of other sporting goods. 41 The availability of unusually detailed information for one such product makes it particularly appropriate for more detailed consideration. The O.M. Scott & Sons Company had a long history both of RPM use and of concern over the adequacy of retail inventories of its line of lawn care products. 42 In 1959, following a management review, Scotts determined to pursue aggressively expanded distribution for its lawn care line. Scotts had a cautionary example in doing so. Vigoro, a competitor, had been the leading seller of lawn care products, but had lost share after expanding distribution to chain and discount stores. 43 The share loss was apparently due to loss of independent dealers alienated by low prices charged by the chain stores.
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[M]anagement thought that the most important factor standing in the way of further rapid growth and market penetration was the inability of the typical Scott dealer to carry an adequate inventory of Scott products. Because of the highly seasonal character of retail sales of the company's products, it was essential that dealers have enough inventory on hand to meet local sales peaks when they came. . . . Failure to supply this demand when it materialized most often resulted in a lost sale to a competitor, although sometimes a customer simply postponed buying.
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Dealer-provided services were of decreasing importance in the Scotts marketing mix, and freeriding on such services was not a major threat. 46 Scotts believed that an increasing segment of potential consumers was passing up its traditional outlets to shop at mass merchandisers.
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To tap these customers, Scotts began to improve its package labeling and to expand point- cates that a policy of waiting until demand was observed prior to filling the retail distribution channel was not feasible.
Microsoft controlled the price at which Windows 95 could be advertised, and thereby effectively controlled the retail selling price, 54 by employing a MAP product promotion scheme.
This plan requires that dealers not cut the price below $89.95 in order to be eligible for Microsoft rebates. 55 Microsoft's motive in offering this program was clear:
the company made the change because WINDOWS 95 is being sold by about 25,000 different retail outlets in the U.S., up from about 12,000 stores in past launches, according to Johan Liedgren, Microsoft's director of channel policies. Many of these retailers would be unable to stock the product if it were widely sold below $89.95, he explains. 56 Similarly, Microsoft's product manager for Windows 95 said that the MAP promotion was adopted to ensure that the product would have "the broadest possible distribution." 57 Thus, the Windows 95 introduction not only meets our criteria, but also was expected to increase Microsoft's retail distribution coverage, coverage that was seemingly unimpaired by the threat of retailer free riding. Our model provides an answer to the question of how prevention of discounting can result in increased inventory holdings.
Summary and Conclusions
In this paper, we have addressed the question of why manufacturers wish to prevent retailers from offering their products at heavily promoted discount prices. This behavior appears at first odd, as RPM is often interpreted as a device to encourage promotion. Yet throughout the history of the RPM debate, manufacturers have objected strenuously to discounting.
Our theory does not require that such discounting either mislead consumers or be supported by subsidies generated by higher-margin unadvertised products. Our discounters charge lower prices than their higher price retail competitors simply because their probability of unsold merchandise is lower. However, the mere presence of discounters forces other retailers to increase their markups, as they will find themselves stuck with unsold merchandise more frequently. For a given wholesale price, the higher markups inhibit consumer demand during high demand states, and thereby shift down the wholesale demand schedule facing the manufacturer. In this sense, niche competition destroys demand. By preventing discounting, the manufacturer can induce inventory adequate to service high demand states.
Our analysis identifies a distribution inefficiency that can be mitigated not only with RPM, but also through vertical integration by the manufacturer into distribution. In our model, RPM and a vertically integrated firm charging a single price are equivalent. Our theory thus suggests a new motivation for integration in the presence of demand uncertainty, one which does not rely on differences between manufacturers and dealers in willingness to bear risk.
We prefer the RPM interpretation because vertical integration is often an impracticable option for the manufacturer. Retailers upon whom RPM is imposed commonly offer the products of a number of manufacturers. Vertical integration would require that the manufacturer not only open its own retail outlets, but also that it integrate with manufacturers of other goods that those outlets carry, for otherwise those manufacturers would continue to face the inventory problems we have identified.
The free-rider theory of RPM has been employed to support proposals that RPM be made lawful (Posner, 1981) . When free riding explains RPM use, it is tempting to dismiss consumer arguments against it as short-sighted desires to take advantage of low prices at free-riding discounters. In our model, consumer attachment to discounting makes more sense, since these discounters are free-standing, not reliant on the promotional efforts of full-price competitors. Whether RPM increases welfare depends on the impact of discounting on total inventory holdings. We have shown that discounters can indeed act as "knaves" that "impair, if not destroy, the production and sale of articles," and have thereby shown that RPM can be welfareenhancing. But we have also shown that RPM will be employed even where discounting would not have seriously impaired distribution, and in such cases would diminish welfare. Which of these effects would dominate were RPM legal is, of course, a difficult empirical question. But it is clear that the discount-prevention argument for RPM, so popular with manufacturers yet seemingly so at variance with sensible economics, does merit careful consideration.
